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A Recipe for Confusion:
Congress and the Federal Rules of Evidence
PROFESSOR DANIEL J. CAPRA

Dana Hassin's Comment on Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides a very incisive and useful analysis of how that troubling Rule can
best be applied when law enforcement officers testify as experts on drug
activity. More importantly, it provides a compelling case study of some
of the negative consequences that arise when Congress bypasses the
rulemaking process and directly amends the Federal Rules of Evidence.
PROBLEM ARISING FROM DIRECT CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF AN
AMENDMENT TO THE EVIDENCE RULES

As Ms. Hassin points out, Rule 704(b) was enacted in direct
response to the perceived injustices in the Hinckley case. This is a hallmark of congressional change to the Federal Rules: when Congress gets
involved, the Rules get changed for political reasons. Congress might
perceive an outrage in a single decision, or perhaps a few decisions, and
lay blame at the foot of the Federal Rules. In such a heated political
environment, members of Congress have little interest in waiting for the
rulemaking process to unfold. The rulemaking process takes a minimum
of three years from proposal to enactment and usually goes beyond the
next election cycle. What is more, if the rulemaking process is used, a
congressman will not be able to say that he sponsored or voted for the
legislation that rectified the outrage. It is hardly political fodder to say,
"I monitored the rulemaking process and did not vote so that the suggested rule could become law."
The problem with a hyped-up political reaction to existing Federal
Rules of Evidence is that it is usually completely disproportionate to the
defect, if any, in the Rule to be amended. An outrageous decision in a
single case, or even in a few cases, does not necessarily mean that the
Rule should be amended. An alternate possibility is that the trial court
simply misread or misapplied the rule, and the appellate court found no
abuse of the trial court's broad discretion. This does not mean that the
error will happen again, much less that it will happen frequently.
Another possibility is that the outrageous case presented unusual facts or
circumstances unlikely to arise again. A third possibility is that the Rule

was properly applied, that the Rule imposed societal costs in the particular application, but that the costs of the Rule are outweighed by its long-
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term benefits, or that the Rule is less costly than other alternatives. A
fourth possibility is that the Rule is in fact problematic, but the courts
are in the process of working it out, will work it out over time, and that
the cost of imposing a new rule will outweigh the benefits of amendment. (This is because every rule change carries the cost of upsetting

settled expectations).
All of these alternatives are better considered by experts in the
deliberations attendant to the rulemaking process, especially since they

are not considered at all in a heated political atmosphere. It can be
expected that when Congress gets involved in drafting evidence rules for
a transitory political purpose, expediency wins out over good drafting.

Rule 704(b) is an obvious example of a problematically-drafted amendment. As Ms. Hassin points out, the amendment was intended to prevent mental health professionals from testifying to a criminal
defendant's intent. But there is no such mental health limitation in the
terms of Rule 704. Because the amendment did not come through the
rulemaking process, there is no advisory committee note that sets forth
with some clarity the scope of the Rule. There was no public comment

period in which academics and other parties could inform the drafters of
the Rule's problematic effects. Consequently, federal courts have spent
seventeen years trying to figure out how a Rule not designed to cover

law enforcement expert testimony can in fact be applied to cover law
enforcement expert testimony.
It should be noted that the Rule 704(b) fiasco is not the only exam1. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1241 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[lI]t is evident
that Rule 704(b) was designed to avoid the confusion and illogic of translating the 'medical
concepts' relied upon by 'psychiatrists and other mental health experts' into legal conclusions.").
The Court in Lipscomb concluded that the most sensible way to read Rule 704(b), in light of its
terms and purposes, is to apply it only to testimony based on a psychiatric or medical analysis of
the defendant's mental processes; see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that Rule 704(b) does not apply to testimony of a law enforcement agent). The
Lipscomb Court was ultimately unprepared, however, to conclude that Rule 704(b) was
completely inapplicable to law enforcement agent-expert testimony. It came to the following
conclusion:
Notwithstanding these alternatives, we simply cannot ignore the fact that this court
and others have routinely assumed that Rule 704(b) imposes an additional
limitation, however slight, on the expert testimony of law enforcement officials. To
reconcile that fact with our impression ... that the rule is of more limited scope, we
conclude that when a law enforcement official states an opinion about the criminal
nature of a defendant's activities, such testimony should not be excluded under Rule
704(b) as long as it is made clear, either by the court expressly or in the nature of
the examination, that the opinion is based on the expert's knowledge of common
criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental
processes. Relevant in this regard, though not determinative, is the degree to which
the expert refers specifically to the "intent" of the defendant, for this may indeed
suggest, improperly, that the opinion is based on some special knowledge of the
defendant's mental processes.
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pie of Congressional politics leading to faulty rulemaking. More
recently, Congress bypassed the rulemaking process to add Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415. These Rules provide for more liberal
admissibility in sexual assault cases where the defendant has committed
a prior act or acts of sexual assault. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
404, evidence of the defendant's character is not admissible to prove that
he had a propensity to commit the crime charged. 2 Congress in Rules
413-415 adopted an exception to this historic limitation, so that evidence
of the defendant's prior sexual misconduct is now "admissible" to prove
his propensity to commit the sexual misconduct charged.3 The Rules
were passed as part of a Congressional effort to get "tough on crime"
and came quickly on the heels of a few poster child cases in which
evidence of a defendant's prior sexual assaults was excluded from trial.
(One of the poster child cases, involving William Kennedy Smith, was
not even a federal case).4 Responding to criticism from the Judicial
Conference, Congress provided for the possibility of reconsideration
should the Judicial Conference make a timely objection to the new
Rules. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules, and subsequently the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure and the Judicial Conference itself, concluded that the
Rules embodied bad policy, and recommended their reconsideration;
Congress refused to do so.5
As an alternative, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
drafted proposed amendments to the rules on character evidence, Rules
404 and 405, that would both correct ambiguities and possible constitutional infirmities identified in new Evidence Rules 413, 414, and 415,
and yet still effectuate Congressional intent. The Advisory Committee
proposal would have: (1) expressly applied the other rules of evidence,
such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the hearsay rule, to evidence
offered under the new rules; (2) expressly allowed rebuttal; (3) expressly
enumerated the factors that a Court must take into account in balancing
under Rule 403; (4) rendered the notice provisions consistent with the
existing notice provision of Rule 404(b); (5) eliminated the notice provisions in civil cases, so that notice would be required as provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (6) permitted reputation and opinLipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242-43. The Lipscomb Court reached an appropriate compromise, by
showing respect for the plain language of the rule but avoiding its most illogical consequences.
2. FED. R. EvID 404.
3. FED. R. EVID. 413; FED. R. EVID. 414; FED. R. EVID. 415.

4. See, State v. Smith, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, #91-005482 CF A; see also
Cathy Booth, The Case That Was Not Heard, TIME, Dec. 23, 1991, at 38.
5. See the discussion of this legislative history in STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO, MICHAEL M.
& DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 677-83 (7th ed. 1998).

MARTIN
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ion evidence only after such evidence has been offered by the defendant. 6 Congress did not adopt any of these proposed changes, and it is
unknown whether they were given meaningful consideration. As a
result, Rules 413-415, as originally enacted by Congress, became effective in 1995.
The Rule 413-415 package is, predictably, full of drafting holes.
Most notably, it is unclear from the Rules whether the trial court has the
discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude a prior act of
sexual misconduct where its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. There are a few snippets from the debate in
Congress indicating that the sponsors of the legislation intended for Rule
403 to apply; but there is nothing as carefully formulated as an Advisory
Committee Note to assist the courts in interpreting the Rule. 7 Luckily,
the courts have uniformly held that the trial judge retains discretion
under Rule 403 when applying these new rules.8 But that is no thanks to
Congress.
THE PROBLEM WITH RULE

704(b)

Ms. Hassin correctly notes that Rule 704(b) has been counterproductive not only because it applies beyond its mental health expert
origin, but more generally because the Rule "requires the jury, as the
finder of fact, to reach a conclusion as to the defendant's mental state
without the benefit of the most useful testimony the expert could offer."9
Rule 704 imposes a limitation on the factfinding process that is contrary
to the search for truth. The Rule is by definition at cross-purposes with
the goal of expert testimony, which is to help the factfinder.
Rule 702 permits expert testimony only when it helps the
factfinder; if the testimony is not helpful, it is not admissible. Rule
704(a) applies that helpfulness standard to "ultimate issue" testimony. It
recognizes that if expert testimony will in fact assist the factfinder, it
6. See The Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Judicial Conference of the
United States on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases
(1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D 51 (1995).
7. See, e.g., 113 Cong. Rec. H5438 (1993) (statement of Representative Kyl, indicating that
under these Rules the trial judge still has discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding no error in the
trial court's exclusion of prior acts of sexual misconduct offered under Rule 413; evidence
admissible under Rule 413 can still be excluded under Rule 403, and the trial judge properly
considered that the prior acts of sexual misconduct offered against the defendant might unduly

confuse the jury); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1997) (construing the
parallel Rule 414: "We view Rule 403 analysis in connection with evidence offered under Rule
414 to be consistent with Congress's intent.")
9. Dana R. Hassin, Comment, How Much is Too Much? Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal

Use vs. Intent to Distribute 55 U. MIAMI L.REV. 667, 671 (2001).
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should not be excluded merely because it encompasses an ultimate issue.
The reasoning behind Rule 704(a) is that if an expert provides a solid
foundation and explanation, then the factfinder is simply left hanging if
the expert cannot cap off the testimony with a conclusion about the ultimate issue to which the expert is testifying. Sometimes, a conclusion on
the ultimate issue ties the expert's testimony together into a coherent
whole, and as such it will be more helpful to state the conclusion along
with the rest of the opinion. The Rule also recognizes that a distinction
between "ultimate" and other issues is elusive, and that common-law
decisions attempting to draw such a distinction were often arbitrary and
unpredictable.
Rule 704(a) permits ultimate issue testimony only if it will be helpful in accordance with Rule 702. The testimony will not be helpful if
the witness simply gives a conclusion on an ultimate issue, without disclosing her reasoning process or any predicate facts. But it might be
helpful if the witness, in the course of explaining difficult matters, lends
context to detailed testimony by then drawing a conclusion on an ultimate issue.' 0
Because Rule 704(a) permits only helpful ultimate issue testimony,
and Rule 704(b) prohibits some testimony admissible under Rule 704(a),
it follows that Rule 704(b) must by definition exclude some helpful
expert testimony. Otherwise it has no reason for being. Unhelpful ultimate issue testimony is already excluded under Rule 702. For example,
in United States v. Scop, the defendants were charged with violation of a
statute prohibiting fraudulent and manipulative securities practices.' I
The expert, a chief investigator for the SEC, declared throughout his
testimony that the defendants had engaged in a "fraudulent" and "manipulative" scheme.' 2 The Court found that the expert "consciously used
the same formulation throughout his testimony," and concluded that this
was impermissible. '3 It noted that the expert "made no attempt to couch
the opinion testimony in even conclusory factual statements but drew
directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying regulations."' 4 Thus, the testimony was conclusory and unhelpful and therefore should have been excluded under Rule 702. The Court did not
10. See, e.g., Fiataruolo v. United States, 8 F.3d 930 (2d Cir. 1993) (in an action for refund of
tax penalties assessed against "responsible persons" for a contractor's unpaid withholding taxes,

there was no error in permitting an expert to opine that the plaintiff was not a responsible person
under the statute, as the opinion was not a bald assertion of law; the conclusion grew out of and

capped off a detailed explanation of the factual situation).
11.
12.
13.
14.

846 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 138.
Id.

Id.
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need, and did not rely on, Rule 704(b) to exclude the evidence. Thus,
the only situation in which Rule 704(b) can have any effect is when it is
invoked to exclude helpful expert testimony. But why on earth should
we exclude helpful expert testimony?
The inherent illogic and harmfulness of Rule 704(b) was lost on
Congress in the heat of the Hinckley result. Ms. Hassin does a fine job
of analyzing the negative impact of Rule 704(b) on the testimony of law
enforcement experts. Her blueprint for permissible testimony under
Rule 704(b) is most helpful.' 5 But if one were to listen to the proposed
testimony from a juror's perspective, one might say to the expert:
"What does it all mean? Get to the point! Stop being so vague! You
give me some building blocks, but why not tell me what you make of all
of it? I might not come out the same way as you, but I would like to
16
know what you think of all this."
For example, the suggested expert on narcotics distribution would
testify to typical amounts distributed at the wholesale level; the price of
that amount; that it is typically sold for cash or on consignment; that the
denomination of the bills depends on the nature of the transaction; and
that a certain number of dosage units can come from a certain amount of
cocaine base. A typical juror might well have difficulty putting all of
this disparate information together with the facts of a case, and might
well have even more difficulty in determining the collective weight of
the elicited factors. Even if each of the facts proven in the case were to
match the very general testimony given by the expert, the juror would be
at a loss to consider the cumulative impact of such a match. The fact
that one fact proven in the case is consistent with drug activity is one
thing, but the fact that five separate facts are each consistent with drug
activity is far more powerful. If the expert were allowed to make a
conclusion on the ultimate issue, the jury would more easily be able to
understand the cumulative impact of the prosecution's case.
All this is not to say that law enforcement experts should be permitted to opine on the defendant's intent without limitation. Again, the
testimony must be helpful to be admissible. If the expert simply takes
the stand and says, "based on my thirty-five years of drug interdiction, I
can tell you that the defendant intended to distribute drugs" this testi15. She also helpfully points out that the Rule 704(b) roadblock can be more successfully
negotiated if the witness is testifying solely as an expert and not as a combination expert/fact
witness. If the witness is solely an expert, it is easier to establish that the opinion "is based on the
expert's knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the
defendant's mental processes." United States v. Willis, 61 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994)).

16. These concerns from a typical juror would not be caused by any shortcoming in Ms.
Hassin's analysis. Rather, they are caused by the fatally flawed Rule 704(b).
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mony should be excluded. It is not helpful; it simply tells the jury to
take the expert's word for it. But if the expert provides particularized
testimony and a solid foundation concerning the typical practices of drug
dealers and explains how the defendant's activity fits those particulars,
she should be able to provide a capstone to her testimony by expressing
a conclusion on the ultimate issue. Otherwise the jury is left hanging.
OTHER COSTS IMPOSED

By

RULE

704(b)

Ms. Hassin focuses on the roadblocks Rule 704(b) imposes on the
government when proffering law enforcement expert testimony. It
should be noted, however, that Rule 704(b) imposes other unnecessary
costs as well. Rule 704(b) has had a negative impact on the testimony of
mental health experts. For example, in United States v. West, 7 the
defendant was charged with bank robbery and his defense was insanity.
The trial judge appointed a psychiatrist to examine West. The psychiatrist concluded that West was suffering from schizoaffective disorder, a
Severe mental disease. But he also concluded that West understood the
wrongfulness of his actions when he robbed the bank.' 8 Defense counsel saw an advantage under Rule 704(b): he could get the expert to testify that the defendant was suffering from schizoaffective disorder
(because that was not an opinion on the ultimate mental state), and yet
he could prevent the expert from testifying that the defendant knew that
what he was doing was wrong (because that was an opinion on the ultimate mental state). Thus, defense counsel had the thrill of using the
state-appointed expert to distort the factfinding process. The government moved to exclude the psychiatrist's testimony, and the trial court
agreed, reasoning that it would be "outrageous" to allow a defendant to
call an expert to testify to a mental disorder when that very expert has
concluded that there was no causal relationship between the illness and
the crime charged. 19
The Court of Appeals reversed in West. It reasoned that the psychiatrist's ultimate conclusion that West knew right from wrong was inadmissible under Rule 704(b). But Rule 704(b) did not operate to exclude
the psychiatrist's conclusion that the defendant was suffering from a
mental disease.2 0 The West Court, like the trial judge, was clearly concerned that the expert's testimony, bereft of its ultimate conclusion,
would be misrepresentative. The Court, however, believed that it was
"obligated to follow the rules Congress has made; and not rewrite or
17. 962 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1992).

18. Id. at 1245.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1248.
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avoid them, however unwise they may be."' I While Rule 704(b) might
have been intended to promote proper jury determination, the Court in
West indicates that the Rule can actually lead to distortions of the
factfinding process.2 2
Nor is the negative impact of Rule 704(b) limited to the prosecution's presentation. Defendants have also suffered from Rule 704(b).
For example, in United States v. Bennett, the defendant was charged
with fraud, check-kiting, money-laundering, and filing false statements
and tax returns. 23 In a pretrial ruling, the court precluded the defendant's psychiatric expert from testifying that the defendant's mental disorders made it "unlikely that he could form the intent to defraud" and
"affected his ability to knowingly and wilfully submit false statements to
the I.R.S." 24 So the jury was left with general testimony about the
defendant's mental disorders without a sufficient explanation of how
these disorders might have affected his culpability for the charged
crimes. Rule 704(b) has also been invoked to preclude defendants from
introducing exculpatory polygraph evidence, on the ground that the
expert's testimony that the defendant was truthful constitutes testimony
as to the defendant's mental state. 25 Rule 704(b) has further been
applied to preclude testimony as to the defendant's physiological
responses to a polygraph, the courts finding "no principled distinction"
between such testimony and a conclusion that the defendant was telling
the truth. 26 So the costs of Rule 704(b) are spread widely across criminal trials.
THE PROBLEM OF LINE-DRAWING

One final and serious cost of Rule 704(b) must be noted: the cost of
line-drawing. As Ms. Hassin points out, there is a continual battle over
how close to the line expert testimony can go without crossing the
deadly barrier of intent. Some courts allow mirroring hypotheticals;
some do not.27 Some find it crucial that the jury is instructed that the
expert has no personal knowledge of the defendant's mental state; some
do not. 28 The thin and variable line between permissible and impermis21. Id. at 1249.
22. See also United States v. Brown, 32 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1994) (criticizing Rule 704(b)
as denying juries "the specialized knowledge of experts in just the type of complex case in which
it is most useful.").
23. 161 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1998).
24. Id. at 183.
25. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 1997).
26. United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 2000).
27. See the cases collected in SALTZBURG, supra note 5, 1425-34.

28. Id.
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sible testimony under Rule 704(b) can be illustrated by a couple of
cases.
In United States v. Brown, the defendant was charged with bank
robbery and interposed an insanity defense.29 The prosecution's psychiatrist testified that Brown suffered from a major depressive disorder, and
may have suffered some depressive episodes with psychotic features.
Following the description of this diagnosis, the prosecutor asked the
expert whether a person suffering from the disorder described was, by
that reason alone, "unable to understand the wrongfulness of his acts?"
and the expert answered "no."' 3° Brown objected that this was ultimate
issue testimony as to his legal sanity, barred by Rule 704(b). But the
trial judge denied the objection and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 3 '
The Court of Appeals in Brown concluded that despite the prohibitory language of Rule 704(b), "testimony may be adduced exploring the
particular characteristics of the mental disease and whether those characteristics render one afflicted with the disease able to appreciate the
wrongfulness or the nature and quality of his behavior. ' 32 Relying on
the finest of distinctions, the Court noted that the prosecution's expert
"never testified to Brown's peculiar mental state" but rather "merely
described Brown's mental disorder and that such an affliction does not
preclude one from appreciating the nature or quality of his acts."3 3 The
Brown Court declared that since the expert testimony was not "specific
to Brown's mental state" but rather concerned "the characteristics of his
mental disorder," it was permitted by Rule 704(b).34 It is clear that the
Court in Brown was struggling with the Rule, and indeed it was critical
of the Rule. The Court declared that the Rule had the misguided purpose of requiring jurors to decide the issue of sanity "without being told
what conclusion an expert would draw. 35 Such a result is counterproductive because it "denies juries the specialized knowledge of
experts in just the type of complex case in which it is most useful. 3 6
Another example of fine line-drawing arose in United States v.
Thigpen,37 where the Court found no error in allowing the prosecutor to
"ask a series of questions to elicit an opinion as to whether [schizophrenia] by necessity implies that a person would be unable to appreciate the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

32 F.3d 236 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.

35. Id. (citing United States v. West, 962 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1992)).
36. Id.
37. 4 F.3d 1573 (11 th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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nature and quality of his acts."'38 The Court stated that these questions
were permissible because "no question by the prosecutor asked the witness to opine whether Thigpen was able to appreciate his actions. 3 9
The Court concluded that while a "thinly veiled hypothetical may not be
used to circumvent Rule 704(b)," the Rule does not bar "an explanation
of the disease and its typical effect on a person's mental state."4 °
The line drawn by the Court in Thigpen is between a hypothetical
that includes virtually all of the characteristics of the defendant (i.e., a
thinly veiled hypothetical), and a more general hypothetical about the
nature of the disease suffered by the defendant and its "typical" effect on
human conduct. But this is hardly a bright line; and it is often meaningless to distinguish between "general" hypotheticals and "thinly veiled"
hypotheticals. For example, in United States v. Kristiansen,4 the defendant was charged with escape from a halfway house. He claimed that he
lacked wilful intent to escape, due to insanity. Kristiansen's expert psychiatrist testified that Kristiansen had been under the influence of
cocaine and suffered from psychosis. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: "Would this severe mental disease ... affect the individual's ability to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of
his acts?"4 2 The trial court sustained an objection, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, reasoning that this was a hypothetical question
designed to elicit testimony on the ultimate issue of intent. In apparent
contrast, the Court held that the defendant should have been permitted to
ask: "Could the severe mental disease ...affect the ability of an individual to appreciate the nature of the quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts?"4 3 The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
[T]he defense should have been permitted to ask this question
because it relates to the symptoms and qualities of the disease itself
and does not call for an answer that describes Kristiansen's culpability at the time of the crime. Rule 704(b) was not meant to prohibit
testimony that describes the qualities of a mental disease.4 4
There is obviously little difference between the two questions put to
the expert in Kristiansen, yet the Court specifically held that one was
permissible under Rule 704(b) and one was not. Apparently, counsel is
not permitted to ask, "Would a person suffering from the defendant's
condition be able to appreciate the nature and quality of his actions?"
38. Id. at 1580.

39. Id.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
901 F.2d 1463 (8th
Id. at 1465.
Id.
Id. at 1466.

Cir.

1990).
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But, counsel is apparently permitted to ask, "Would the defendant's condition affect the ability of a person suffering from that condition to
appreciate the nature and quality of his actions?"
While the above examples concern mental health expert testimony,
Ms. Hassin shows quite powerfully that the same line-drawing difficulties apply to the testimony of law enforcement experts. For example,
United States v. Lipscomb4 5 involved typical expert testimony from drug
enforcement agents, to the effect that the seized drugs were for "street
level distribution."4 6 The Court began by noting that courts applying
Rule 704(b) would typically find this testimony permissible, because the
expert did not say that the particular defendant had an intent to distribute
drugs. The Court found, however, that this distinction was relatively
useless when applied to the testimony of law enforcement agent-experts:
In the first place, though officers did not in fact say "intent" or
"intended," they may as well have, for the effect would have been
exactly the same. If the drugs found on Lipscomb "were for street
sale distribution," as each of the officers testified, then Lipscomb
47
possessed them for that purpose; he intended to distribute them.
The Lipscomb Court quite rightly saw the insubstantial nature of the
distinction between "the drugs were for street sale distribution" and
"Lipscomb, who was found with the drugs, was engaged in street sale
distribution. '48 But the Court nonetheless found this distinction warranted and indeed required by Rule 704(b).
One can only conclude that any Rule that relies on such an evanescent distinction does not deserve a long life in the Federal Rule of
Evidence.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THIS RULE?

The reader might ask: "If the Rule is so terrible, why not get rid of
it?" Isn't the author of this response the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules? Instead of complaining, why not get the
Advisory Committee to do something about it? My response to such a
question is twofold:
1) I am only the Reporter; I can't get the Advisory Committee to
do anything. Issues for the Committee are generated by suggestions from judges, lawyers, and academics, and from the Advisory Committee members themselves. The Reporter's role is to
assist the Committee with background research, to provide
45.
46.
47.
48.

14 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1240.
Id.
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drafting alternatives, and to prepare the Advisory Committee
Note. Reporters who conceive themselves as members of the
Committee they serve usually do not serve very long.
2) More importantly, the provenance of Rule 704(b) makes it difficult to abrogate or amend through the rulemaking process. It is
clear that Congress has ultimate authority over federal court
rulemaking. The rulemaking process established by the Enabling Act 4 9 provides for court-generated rulemaking, but Congress did not cede its oversight, nor its ultimate authority to
amend the Rules directly. It would be quite awkward for the
Advisory Committee, and then the Judicial Conference, to recommend the abrogation of a Rule that was enacted directly by
Congress.
The rulemaking process is designed to be less political than the
legislative process, but politics, broadly speaking, is still a part of court
rulemaking. Amending or abrogating rules of evidence only makes
sense where the benefits of an amendment clearly outweigh the costs.
On the cost side must be included any long-term harm to the rulemaking
process that might arise from a conflict between the courts and Congress. If the courts are surviving with the rule as they appear to be,
however unhappily, the benefits of a rule change are unlikely to outweigh the costs. This is not to speak of the costs of upsetting settled
expectations that come with any rule change.
A less onerous alternative might be to amend Rule 704(b) to limit
its bad effect to the testimony of mental health professionals. Such an
amendment might look something like this:
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
(b) No mental health expert witness testifying with respee to
the mental state or... ditir of a defenda- in a criminal case may
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
The reason this proposal is more "politically" palatable is because it can
be pitched as an amendment that restores Rule 704(b) to its originally
intended scope, i.e., as a limit on psychiatric testimony such as that in
the Hinckley case. As such, it is not a slap to the face of Congress. It
49. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
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can even be pitched as correcting the courts' misinterpretation of what
Congress must have, in its infinite wisdom, intended.
Of course, the amendment is not a cure-all because the courts will
still be beset with line-drawing and with the stifling of the truthfinding
function when mental health experts are called to testify. But at least
these problems will no longer spill over to law enforcement experts.
This more limited amendment would mean that the vast majority of
expert witnesses in a criminal trial would no longer be subject to the
insubstantial distinctions of Rule 704(b).
Now, if only somebody could suggest this change to the Advisory
Committee.

